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The present article provides a brief characteristic of the three concepts of metaphysics that emerged 
during the history of philosophy. The first one, the concept by Descartes, indicates metaphysics as the 
fundament for philosophy; the second one, the concept by Hegel, understands metaphysics as a rational 
style of thinking. Aristotle claims that the initial concept contains the idea of the extrasensory reality 
which is the object of metaphysics as a division or a type of philosophy. The article substantiates the 
connection of metaphysics with the agent’s confidence of the objectiveness of cognition, or dogmatism. 
It states the principal antagonism of dogmatism and skepticism as epistemological mindsets. It 
arrives at the conclusion that dogmatism is an epistemological and an ontological phenomenon which 
manifests itself in the agent’s confidence of objective learning of the world, of the creative power of 
mind and its ability of absolute value construction. The presented characteristic of dogmatism points 
at its underlying role in both cognitive activity and in the establishment of different types of world 
outlook.
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Since the times of R. Descartes metaphysics 
has been considered to be the fundament for 
philosophy [Descartes R. 1989. P. 309]. Martin 
Heidegger, who had been paying great attention 
to the search for the answer to the question 
on what metaphysics is, finally arrived at the 
following conclusion: the object of metaphysics 
is being: “it deals with beings as beings. In this 
manner, metaphysics always represents beings as 
such in their totality; it deals with the beingness 
of beings” [Heidegger M. 1993. P.34]. The 
tradition to refer to the major, basic problems of 
philosophy as metaphysical was supported by 
both Western and Russian existentialists [See 
Abbagnano N. 1998; Berdiaev N.A. 1995]. In 
modern Russian research both the term and the 
theme of metaphysics itself is used as a marker 
for basic knowledge or the main ideas of any 
branch [Bachinin V.A., 2001; Hildebrand D., 
2000; Terebikhin N., 2004].
In Russian philosophy of the Soviet 
period metaphysics was understood within the 
framework of ideas of Engels. Understanding of 
metaphysics was limited to the reasonable style 
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of thinking opposed to dialectics. However, the 
original source of this idea is the philosophy of 
Hegel who, assuming the Medieval scholastics, 
wrote: “It is however only in reference to the 
history of philosophy that this Metaphysic can 
be said to belong to the past: the thing is always 
and at all places to be found, as the view which 
the abstract understanding takes of the objects 
of reason” [Hegel, P. 134]. It was this meaning 
of metaphysics that was expanded in Marxist 
philosophy due to the famous works of F. Engels 
“Dialectics of Nature” and “Anti-Dühring”. They 
opposed metaphysics and metaphysical style of 
thinking to dialectics. Just like Hegel, Engels 
referred to metaphysics as to a matter of reason, 
considering the metaphysical way of thinking 
to become “one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost 
in insoluble contradictions” [Engels F., 1961]. 
After the works by Hegel and Engels, in Marxist 
philosophy metaphysics became a synonym of 
anti-dialectics, and later a universal tag to indicate 
any weaknesses of the criticized theories [Lenin 
Reflection Theory, 1981].
The rejection and abrupt criticism of 
reasonable metaphysics brought certain confusion 
into the established terminology. Consequently, in 
the history of philosophy the following customs 
of term use have been developed.
The first understanding of metaphysics can 
be called after Descartes. Here metaphysics is 
understood as the core, the central and the basic 
part of philosophy, the fundament of it. This 
meaning is emphasized by both Existentialists and 
neo-Thomists. The second meaning dates back 
to Hegel and Engels, where metaphysics acted 
as the antipode of dialectic thinking. However, 
metaphysics owes its most ancient and original 
meaning to Aristotle and his students [See 
Motroshilova N., 1964; Lobkovich N., 1995]. 
The term of metaphysics was first mentioned 
in the 1st century B.C., when its meaning was 
formed under the influence of two traditions. 
According to the first of them, the meaning of 
the term originated from the treatise by Aristotle 
that spoke of the “first philosophy” or the “divine 
science”. 
A librarian from Alexandria, Andronicus 
of Rhodes, the eleventh scholarch of Peripatetic 
school who created the first full editions of all 
the works by its founder, arranging the works 
by Aristotle in the order they are still presented 
in the modern editions: starting from logics, 
natural philosophy to ethics, politics and rhetoric. 
In the series of fourteen books “Metaphysics” 
followed another one, “Physics”, and its title, “ta 
biblia ta meta ta physika” is literally translated 
as “the books that come after the [books on] 
physics”. Before Andronicus of Rhodes the 
term “metaphysics” in relation to the treatise by 
Aristotle had never been used, which is proved 
by the famous work by Diogenes Laertius, who 
mentioned the work of the first philosophy by 
Aristotle without using its present title.
The second tradition is also connected to 
the interpretation of works by Aristotle. The 
ones standing at the origins of this tradition 
are, obviously, Alexander of Aphrodisias and 
Neo-Platonist Asclepius. They suggested that 
metaphysics owed its existence exceptionally to 
the fact that the disputable texts were dedicated to 
the divine reality, consequently, separated from 
matter. The tradition is based on the polysemy 
of the Greek word “meta” itself, which means, 
“beyond, later, after”. That is why “Metaphysics” 
by Aristotle was understood as the “book 
narrating of what lies beyond physics”. This 
tradition was developed in the Medieval period, 
brightly incarnated in Thomism. The new times 
established the tradition in the whole scholastics 
and in the times of Kant and Hegel metaphysics 
became the symbol of the scholastic, or, as it has 
been mentioned above, reasonable thinking.
However, it is possible that understanding 
of “Metaphysics” of something following physics 
– 1302 –
Sergey F. Denisov and Lubov V. Denisova. Metaphysics and Dogmatism
was a mere coincidence. But one should notice 
that the word “metaphysics” itself bears a deep 
meaning which finds its reflection in the semantics 
of the term itself. In the times of Aristotle and in 
the medieval times the “physicists” mostly relied 
on their sensation, which caused the association 
of physics in the philosophic-epistemological 
dimension with sensory perception. 
Correspondingly, physics or sensory perception 
is followed by conceptual thinking. In other 
words, the concept of metaphysics originally 
states the indication not of the sensory, but of the 
intellective, extrasensory reality, of the product 
of abstract, underlying thinking, which are the 
categories presented in the treatise by Aristotle. 
Such coincidence cannot be ignored. Therefore, 
we may now speak of the original, or of the third 
meaning of the term, which refers to metaphysics 
as to the science of the extrasensory.
Consequently, the subject matter of 
metaphysics is the extrasensory world, different 
from the sensory world given in sensation. The 
extrasensory world includes a series of ideal 
objects, concepts, moral principles, ideals and 
supreme purposes of human existence which 
principally cannot be perceived by means of 
sensation. It is only a singular utterance the 
existence whereof the latter is able to prove, 
while the objects of extrasensory world consist 
of universal concepts and ideas lying beyond 
sensation. In this way, the extrasensory world 
is off-the-limits for human contemplation, if, 
of course, by the limit we understand sensation 
itself. Such off-the-limits contemplations can 
be neither confirmed nor refuted by means of 
sensation [Kant I., 1966. P. 183].
As, being detached from the terrestrial basis 
of sensation, thinking goes beyond the limits, 
the arising of the question of objectivity of such 
sphere is inevitable. There is little chance that 
anyone would guarantee that their reason, leaving 
the grounds of sensation, may avoid illusions. 
Perhaps, everything created by the reason is 
nothing but chimaeras existing nowhere but in 
our imagination. It should seem that this problem 
must paralyze the activity of mind at least at the 
initial stages of development of metaphysics as 
a science of the extrasensory. But the reason 
overcomes this state due to dogmatism, or the 
confidence of the person of the objectivity of 
the extrasensory world, making metaphysics 
possible.
Modern secular culture usually reads 
negative sense in the concept of dogmatism. 
Once, there was a depreciating description of 
dogmatism worded in the treatise by I. Kant who 
considered his main task to relieve the science 
from the “old worm-eaten dogmatism” [Kant I., 
1965. P. 74]. In Russian philosophy of the Soviet 
period dogmatism was categorically understood 
as an unserious, shallow, superficial style of 
thinking [Dogmatism, 1983; Sitkovsky E., 1962].
A different understanding of dogmatism 
arises at the consideration of the term within the 
religious doctrine context [See Kanakov D.V., 
2010]. Dogmatism cannot be understood correctly 
without consideration of its etymology which 
goes back to the Greek term of “dogma” which 
is literally translated as “anything declared 
right”. Cicero used the word dogma to refer to 
such doctrines which, being commonly known, 
had the significance of the undeniable truth. In 
the ancient times the word “dogma” also referred 
to the decrees and resolutions of the authorities 
asking absolute obedience. 
In philosophy, the abstract theorems, as well 
as ideals, are not subject to substantiations by 
means of sensation; their verity does not evoke 
any doubt due to their simplicity or is simply 
taken on trust. Thus, Aristotle used the word 
“dogma” to refer to the general conviction of the 
philosophers that “nothing comes from nothing”. 
It is known that the Epicureans and the Stoics 
believed that a wise man needed to have dogmas, 
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i.e. some theorems and ideals to follow and reach 
the right and truthful way of life.
According to Sextus Empiricus, the 
classification of the main philosophic trends may 
be based on the attitude of philosophers to the 
truth. Sextus Empiricus calls the first ones the 
Dogmatists, who claim that they have found the 
truth; among them, he lists Aristotle, Epicurus 
and the Stoics. The second ones suggest that 
the truth cannot be perceived or reproduced in 
any way: it is a group of Academists headed by 
Carneades, Clitomachus and others. The third 
ones composing the group of Skeptics are still 
engaged with the search for the truth. Proceeding 
from this, writes Sextus Empiticus, it is correct 
to admit that there are three basic genera of 
philosophy: dogmatic, academic and skeptic 
[Sextus Empiricus, 1976. P. 207].
It is remarkable that in the ancient epoch one 
of the basic objects of criticism for the Skeptics 
was the philosophy of the Stoics, which claimed 
more than cognoscibility of the world, but also 
naturalness of reason, as well as the necessity 
for human to rely on the rational form of nature. 
In order to substantiate the rationality of human 
behavior the Stoics used to include some rational 
power into the structure of nature, believing it 
to be controlling the irrational nature, regulating 
and leading it to the supreme purposes. 
According to the Stoics, all the endless diversity 
of the things existing in the world are compelled 
by cosmic reason to the main objective, which 
is the victory of rational nature over irrational, 
of the superior reason over the inferior. The 
main idea of Stoic anthropology was the idea 
of impartial attitude to the world. Impartiality 
in human behavior was understood as the 
expression of rational nature domination over 
the irrational. Therefore, passion was interpreted 
as irrational, contradicting the rational nature, 
not nature in general. This idea served as the 
basis for the Stoic formula of freedom as the 
conscious need and submission to it. One should 
also notice that by need the Stoics understood 
rational nature as such. Consequently, freedom 
could be also defined as submission of a human 
to the rational nature. The misunderstanding of 
this central Stoic idea often leads researchers to 
wrong conclusions [See, for example, Chanyshev 
A.N., 1991].
According to I. Kant, Skepticism could be 
wise and useful for metaphysics if it reached the 
initial point not to stop at it, but to keep going 
forward. Skepticism has not only been stacked 
against metaphysical dogmatism; it has always 
strived for casting doubt even on sensation itself 
[Kant I., 1966].
The whole history of skepticism says that 
it was originally anti-metaphysical and stacked 
against dogmatism, i.e. it was ultimately aimed at 
the destruction of the fundaments of metaphysics, 
casting doubt on the ability of reason to cognize 
the underlying causes of things. Skepticism judges 
from what the reason can assume about the things 
given to the person in his sensation only. In other 
words, reason is limited with the framework of 
experience, while the epistemological capacity 
of the latter is known to be strictly limited. 
According to D. Hume, reason is not capable 
of cognizing the cause and consequences; these 
categories are nothing but a phenomenon of 
our psychological confidence, i.e. subjective in 
their essence. Probably the deepest causes and 
principles that we shall ever discover in nature 
are these: elasticity, gravity, cohesion of parts 
and communication of motion by impact. “We 
shall be lucky if by careful work we can explain 
particular phenomena in terms of these four, or 
something close to them” [Hume D., 1966. P. 33]. 
The incapability of reason to cognize the cause 
and sequence relations leads metaphysics to 
impossibility as a science of the extrasensory. I. 
Kant noticed that “The acute man was, however, 
looking only to the negative benefit that curbing 
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the excessive claims of speculative reason would 
have, in completely abolishing so many endless 
and continual conflicts that perplex the human 
species; he meanwhile lost sight of the positive 
harm that results if reason is deprived of the most 
important vistas, from which alone it can stake 
out for the will the highest goal of all the will’s 
endeavors” [Kant I., 1965. P.72]. 
So, opposing dogmatism to skepticism, one 
may outline the following generic features of 
metaphysical dogmatism.
First of all, dogmatism relies on the 
confidence in the achievement of the truth. Any 
cognition of being, underlying foundations of 
the world, any construction of the saintly life 
ideals necessarily suggests the presence of such 
confidence in the success, in the real achievement 
of the truth. Skepticism, on the opposite, is 
aimed at the denial of such a mindset [See also 
Nikolaev E.A., 2009]. From the psychological-
epistemological point of view dogmatism is 
characterized with optimism, while skepticism – 
with pessimism.
Secondly, the psychological confidence of a 
scholar calling himself dogmatic in the cognition 
of the truth relies, first of all, on the confidence 
in the creative power of mind and thinking. The 
position of metaphysical dogmatism assumes 
that human mind is not only capable of objective 
cognition of the world, but also of the functioning 
similarly to the surrounding nature, following the 
laws independent from the subjective desires of 
both the person and the humankind as a whole. 
This dogmatic confidence found its incarnation, 
on one hand, in the idea of equality of being and 
thinking, and on the other hand, in the idea of 
adequate reflection of the objective reality in the 
human consciousness. From this point of view 
dogmatism can be characterized as objectivism, 
while skepticism – as subjectivism.
Thirdly, the dogmatic confidence in the 
creative power of mind manifests itself in the 
idea of irrational nature and the rational need 
a person should orient to. Skepticism with its 
antidogmatic mindsets aims at, first of all, the 
denial of reason, strives to substantiate the need 
for a human to surrender to irrational nature.
To conclude, we may also add that 
skepticism is not the only thing dogmatism is 
opposed to; it is also opposite to sophistics. This 
opposition is manifested in between “absolute – 
relative”. A dogmatic scholar insists on the 
possibility of constructing absolute knowledge 
and absolute values, which is significant for the 
substantiation of epistemological optimism and 
moral values.
Therefore, dogmatism is an epistemological 
and ontological phenomenon which manifests 
itself in the confidence of a person in the objective 
cognition of the world, in the creative power of 
mind and its ability to construct absolute values. 
This dogmatism presents what I. Kant used to call 
“the natural inclination of man to metaphysics”. 
Even though metaphysics proved to be incapable 
of substantiating the objectivity of thinking, it 
is saturated with the confidence in the existence 
of objective laws of thinking, in the laws for 
development of mind similar to those of the laws 
regulating the human world itself. Obviously, 
many people are aware of the dogmatic character 
of metaphysics, as human knowledge is limited 
and the surrounding reality is inexhaustible; for 
this reason, searching for the supreme sense of 
nature or “the world order”, as Fichte used to say, 
a metaphysicist has to rely on nothing but faith. 
Human knowledge covering only a minor part 
of the whole reality is not capable of describing 
this “world order” in the genuinely scientific 
way leading to reliable results. The only thing it 
has is the faith in the greater good, forming the 
fundament for any certain reality [Lotze R.H., 
1971. P. 637].
The significance of dogmatism in 
the theory of cognition is enormous. It is 
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dogmatism that makes metaphysics possible. It 
is due to dogmatism a person leaves its sensory 
world and aspires to get beyond it, to reach 
the extrasensory reality, unaware of having 
flung himself to the mercy of metaphysics. 
Dogmatism as epistemological confidence 
of person of the objectivity and absoluteness 
of the extrasensory world does not remain 
unchanged; just like everything in this world, 
it is subject to development. At the first 
stages of its formation dogmatism generates 
the mythological reality, then the religious 
reality until finally it becomes the base for 
the epistemological and logical argumentation 
leading to the development of philosophy. 
A myth is deprived of any epistemological 
reasons, and the confidence in the objectivity 
and absoluteness of the extrasensory world is 
blindly supported by customs and traditions: in 
religion confidence is predominantly unproved, 
relied on the psychological confidence in better 
life and salvation; in philosophy, metaphysical 
dogmatism finds its development in science and 
the world outlooks it generates.
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В статье дана краткая характеристика трех возникших в истории философии смыслов 
метафизики. Первый – декартовский – указывает на метафизику как фундамент философии, 
второй – гегелевский – является пониманием метафизики как рассудочного стиля мышления. 
Аристотелевский – первоначальный смысл содержит представление о свехчувственной 
реальности, которая и становится объектом метафизики как раздела или вида философии. 
В статье обосновывается связь метафизики с уверенностью субъекта в объективности 
познания – догматизмом. Утверждается принципиальный антагонизм догматизма и 
скептицизма как гносеологических установок. Делается вывод о том, что догматизм 
представляет собой гносеологическое и онтологическое явление, которое проявляется 
в уверенности субъекта в объективном познании мира, в творческой мощи разума и его 
способности конструировать абсолютные ценности. Представленная характеристика 
догматизма содержит указание на его важнейшую роль как в познавательной деятельности, 
так и в становлении различных типов мировоззрения. 
Ключевые слова: метафизика, догматизм, сверхчувственная реальность, философия, 
скептицизм, гносеологическая установка.
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